Reduction in the Number of Members of China’s Central Military Commission: How It Will Affect the Chinese Army

 

Since taking power, China’s supreme leader Xi Jinping has made purges under the guise of fighting corruption a hallmark of his rule. As chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi has carried out similar purges within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), initially targeting officers from rival factions before turning against the military leaders he himself had promoted. The second wave of the PLA’s anti-corruption campaign, launched in 2023, destabilized the top military command, leading to the removal of several active members of the CMC, The Diplomat reports.

 

Defense Minister and CMC member Li Shangfu was the first to be removed, disappearing from public view in August 2023. His case was referred for criminal prosecution in June 2024, but no verdict has been reported. In November 2024, the director of the CMC’s Political Work Department, Miao Hua, also fell from grace. Then, in April 2025, The Financial Times reported that CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong had been dismissed from office, becoming the first sitting CMC vice chairman to be removed since 1967. He has not appeared publicly since.

 

These unprecedented dismissals have reduced the number of CMC members from seven to four. As China’s top defense decision-making body, the CMC oversees around three million PLA personnel and 500,000 members of the People’s Armed Police. The reduction in the number of CMC members under such extraordinary circumstances is certain to have profound consequences for the PLA’s ability to function as a modern military organization.

 

The Central Military Commission (CMC) is an organ of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Following the principle that “the Party commands the gun,” the CMC’s directives shape decisions on all military matters—such as C4ISR systems (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), officer promotions, development of war plans, reform initiatives, research and development programs, procurement, military diplomacy, and ensuring the CPC’s control over the armed forces.

 

At the core of the CMC are its chairman, vice chairmen, and other members who meet regularly to discuss key national defense issues. At its peak in the 1960s, the CMC had more than ten permanent members, a number that was reduced during the Deng Xiaoping era following personnel downsizing measures. In the reform era, CMC membership became standardized and included the directors of the four general departments and the heads of the PLA services.

 

However, these norms have no longer been observed since Xi Jinping came to power and launched a series of purges. During his first term as CMC chairman, Xi dismissed two active members of the CMC from rival factions. In his second term, which began in 2017, Xi downsized the CMC and appointed members primarily based on political loyalty rather than institutional representation. Xi’s third term brought even further reductions to the CMC, with ongoing purges shrinking its active membership to just four individuals.

 

 

As a result, the ability and experience of the remaining members will directly affect the performance of the CMC. Xi, who chairs the CMC, does not have a wealth of military experience. He served in the PLA for nearly three years as secretary to then-Defense Minister Geng Biao. During this period, Xi followed Geng but did not gain first-hand experience as a military commander.

The CMC’s vice chairman, Zhang Youxia, who manages the PLA’s day-to-day affairs on Xi’s behalf, has combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese War. A childhood acquaintance of Xi, Zhang joined the PLA in 1968 and participated in operations against Vietnam in 1979 as a company commander. In the 1980s, Zhang led a regiment in border conflicts between China and Vietnam. Respected as a brave commander, Zhang’s subsequent career advancement was largely due to his battlefield experience, Red Prince lineage, and friendship with Xi.

General Liu Zhenli, who heads the Joint Staff, is the second career officer in the CMC. Like Zhang Youxie, Liu participated in military operations along the Sino-Vietnamese border in the 1980s and earned the First Class Combat Merit Medal. He later commanded various military units before becoming Chief of Staff of the People's Armed Police, and then serving as Commander of the Ground Forces.

 

Rocket Force General Zhang Shengmin is the only non-military officer currently in the CMC. He is secretary of the CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection, the PLA’s anti-corruption agency, and he effectively exercises Xi’s control over the military. As a professional political commissar, Zhang Shengmin is well-suited to internal oversight. Like Xi, he has limited operational and combat experience. Given the current composition of the CMC, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are likely to offer the most valuable military input. However, the tense atmosphere of fear and conformity, conditioned by the recent purges, certainly gives Xi the most powerful voice in defense affairs, despite his lack of a strong military résumé. Xi’s directives override all others and are unlikely to be challenged by professional officers. This dynamic has concrete implications for the CMC’s function as the supreme decision-making body for national defense.

 

 

In recent years, decision-making within the PLA at the highest levels has become increasingly centralized. However, the shrinking circle of CMC leaders means that more responsibility falls on each individual member. The smallest CMC has been chaired since 1949 by Xi, whose assertiveness and willingness to purge subordinates have cemented his dominance at Commission meetings. Xi’s opinions are unlikely to be challenged, creating a lack of intellectual diversity and fueling a potential echo chamber. The current CMC effectively relies on the thinking of one man, who significantly lacks formal military expertise. Still, the presence of combat-experienced professionals like Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli could significantly aid Xi’s decision-making—though their positions remain precarious in an environment overshadowed by the rapid purges.

Xi’s apparent lack of urgency in replacing the purged CMC members suggests that he is comfortable with the current CMC consisting of a small circle of commissioners. In fact, in peacetime, this configuration benefits Xi, who seeks

concentrated power. A closed group is easier to manage. Without the pressures of war, a small CMC can still manage PLA affairs without major obstacles.

In the event of war, however, this compact leadership structure could prove inadequate to handle the demands of a high-intensity conflict. Xi would then face a dilemma of whether to delegate more authority to military professionals and invite them to the CMC roster, or to continue to rely on a narrow circle of loyal advisors to conduct the war—an approach that would likely limit the PLA’s effectiveness.

In essence, a reduced and diminished CMC—especially one weakened by purges—risks undermining the PLA’s decision-making capacity, especially in wartime. Furthermore, the true extent of the purges within the organs controlled by the CMC remains unclear. But it is almost certain that the fall of a department director, such as Miao Hua of the CMC’s Political Work Department, would likely lead to further purges of his subordinates, meaning that the scope of the disruption could be broader than previously thought. While Xi may feel comfortable operating within a close-knit group of loyalists, the consequences of a weakened CMC could significantly diminish the PLA’s warfighting capabilities.

It is the official dismissal of Admiral Miao Hua and “General No. 2,” as the media dubbed General He Weidong, that has sparked a series of discussions about the real reasons for their dismissals and what is actually going on within Xi’s widely proclaimed fight against corruption.

The cases of the dismissed senior officers highlight how pervasive and deep-rooted Xi Jinping sees the problems in the military as. It is particularly important to note that Miao Hua, as director of the CMC’s political work department, was responsible for ideological work within the PLA. This raises the question of whether these cases primarily involve corruption or reflect broader concerns about disloyalty to Xi Jinping, although this is certainly not ruled out, according to the Swedish National China Centre analysis.

The analysis further notes that the immediate impact of the ongoing purge on the PLA’s military readiness and operational capabilities is difficult to assess. This depends in part on the real reasons for the officials’ dismissals – which may never be fully known – as well as on the loyalty of the remaining generals. At the very least, the purge is likely to temporarily weaken the PLA’s ability to effectively carry out Xi’s orders.

The authors recall that the ties between Miao Hua and Xi Jinping date back to the 1990s and early 2000s, when both served in Fujian province. Miao’s downfall is described as a case in which Xi removed one of his protégés. While it is not new for Xi to remove people he himself appointed and who were considered Xi loyalists, Miao’s case shows that he is willing to target individuals with personal connections that go back decades.

They also wonder if Xi’s power could have weakened to the point that he can no longer protect his protégés? While it is important not to take Xi’s authority for granted, it seems much more likely that he remains firmly in control of the purge. Xi has spent the last decade installing loyalists in key positions throughout the system. It seems highly unlikely that the CCDI would target a senior military official without explicit instructions from Xi or his approval.

Similar considerations emerged after the dismissal of He Weidong, who in addition to being the second-ranking officer in the PLA, Weidong is also a member of the Communist Party's Politburo.

He Weidong's dismissal came six months after Xi dismissed Miao Hua. Although the Chinese government has not made an official statement, several sources have reported that General Weidong has been detained and questioned, possibly in a corruption case. He has not appeared at public events recently, which raises questions about his position, UNN reported.

Experts believe that Xi Jinping is trying to ensure that the military is loyal to the Communist Party and ready to take on global challenges. Neil Thomas, a China expert, said: "This shows how seriously Xi takes the fight against corruption in the military."

However, it is emphasized that the dismissal of General Weidong comes at a time when China is facing other serious challenges, including economic problems and rising tensions with the United States. At such times, maintaining unity and control over the armed forces becomes even more important for Chinese leaders.

part of the highest ranks of the country's People's Liberation Army.

AlJazeera recalled that under Xi Jinping's leadership, eight members of the CMC have been dismissed since 2012 - a number not seen since the era of Mao Zedong. Recent dismissals of high-ranking officers include two defense ministers, Li Shangfu (2023) and Wei Fenghe, two heads of the PLA Rocket Force (responsible for the nuclear arsenal), two senior CMC officials and He Weidong, the vice chairman of the CMC.

Many of the dismissals appear to be related to corruption in military procurement. Also, many of the dismissed military officials were appointed by Xi, raising concerns about his ability to choose reliable subordinates.

The purges reflect the latest unrest in China's armed forces. Beijing wants to project an image of strength and stability on the world stage. The purges risk disrupting that image, although at a time when global attention is focused on the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, the changes in senior personnel in China's military may attract less attention.

 

 

 

Since taking power in 2012, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in China’s civil service has investigated millions of officials and punished hundreds of thousands. The campaign targets both high-ranking “tigers” and low-ranking “flies,” and it extends beyond the military to the civilian service. It is worth recalling that, for example, he mysteriously disappeared from public view in 2023 after former Foreign Minister Qin Gang was dismissed.

However, the dismissals of high-ranking officers from the CMC and the military seem to attract the most attention, although the real reasons for their dismissals are rarely reported in Chinese media. Official statements usually cite “serious disciplinary violations” as the reason for the dismissal of high-ranking officials, which is translated by the Chinese and international public as dismissal for corruption.

However, analysts have recently begun to question the judgment of Chinese President Xi Jinping after he purged loyal associates he himself appointed to those positions, after dismissing all members of other factions within the Communist Party of China in the early years of his anti-corruption campaign.

 

 

The military dialogue between the United States and China, seen as crucial to avoiding accidental conflicts, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, has been limited under President Donald Trump, who has also dismissed several senior military officials. U.S. military representatives traveled to Shanghai for talks in April, but there has been no public sign of high-level meetings.

The U.S. and Chinese defense ministers sometimes meet at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual defense forum held in Singapore last month. But this year China sent only a small, low-ranking delegation.

 

In the past two years, Xi has dismissed two defense ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe; two heads of the PLA Rocket Force, which is responsible for missiles and the nuclear arsenal; and two senior CMC officials. Senior business leaders in the air force and defense have also been removed from the CCP’s advisory body.

 

Many of the recent dismissals appear to be linked to the investigation into corruption in military procurement. Li, who was removed from his post as defense minister in 2023 and expelled from the CCP last year, previously headed the procurement department. Several of his aides in the military and procurement departments have also been removed.

 

Miao is the eighth CMC member to be removed since Xi took power in 2012. The expulsion of CMC members was unprecedented since the era of Mao Zedong.

 

Xi took power on a promise to root out corruption in China, vowing to hunt down both “tigers and flies.” Since then, millions of officials have been investigated and hundreds of thousands have reportedly been punished, including high-profile individuals who have been expelled or prosecuted.

 

But after more than a decade in power, many of the high-ranking figures targeted in anti-corruption campaigns are people, like Miao and Li, who were personally appointed by Xi, raising questions about his ability to vet important appointments.

 

One of Xi’s most high-profile candidates for removal was former foreign minister Qin Gang. Qin disappeared from public view in June 2023, drawing global attention as one of China’s most outspoken officials. Speculation that he was under investigation persisted until October, when Beijing announced he had been removed from his post. No reason was given.