Russian influence on political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Haris Ljevo
The phenomenon of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is no longer an abstract threat from EU strategic documents, but a very concrete instrument of power that has been tested and perfected for years precisely on the periphery of the European order, including the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The latest reports of the European External Action Service (EEAS) describe FIMI as “a critical and evolving threat to democratic processes worldwide,” inextricably linked to cyberattacks, hybrid threats, and a broader geopolitical narrative conflict. In practice, this means that elections, referendums, protests, and even public policy debates are no longer conducted solely in parliaments and polling stations, but also in networks of covert portals, bot accounts, and coordinated social media campaigns.
Russia is explicitly identified in those reports as the main actor in FIMI operations targeting the EU and its neighborhood. The EEAS maps the infrastructure of these operations and shows that it is a sophisticated network consisted of hundreds of campaigns, thousands of accounts and at least 25 different platforms used to spread disinformation, erode trust and undermine democratic institutions. Although the documents do not list all the countries individually, it is clear that the Western Balkans are a “laboratory” for testing narratives that are later recycled in the wider European space: from stories about the “decadent West” and the “failed EU”, to narratives about the “legitimate Russian sphere of influence” and “threatened Serbs” in the region.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is particularly vulnerable in this context. The combination of deep ethnic divisions, dysfunctional constitutional architecture, fragmented media system and chronic distrust in institutions creates an ideal terrain for FIMI operations. Foreign actors do not need to invent divisions, because such divisions already exist. They only need to amplify, direct and make them more visible. This is precisely why Russian narratives in Bosnia and Herzegovina often “lean” on existing political conflicts, crises over government property, blockades of institutions, challenges to Constitutional Court decisions, disputes over the electoral law. Each of these topics can become an entry point for information manipulation.
One of the key goals of FIMI operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the delegitimization of the state as such. The narrative of BiH as an “impossible”, “artificial” or “protectorate” state fits perfectly into the Russian strategy of weakening European influence in the Balkans. In this framework, the EU is portrayed as a force that imposes solutions, supports “illegitimate” institutions and “suppresses” the rights of constituent peoples, while Russia positions itself as the protector of “sovereignty” and “traditional values”. Such narratives are spread not only through openly pro-Russian media, but also through regional portals from Serbia, which are then taken over into Bosnia and Herzegovina without verification and often in the form of copy-paste news.
Another important goal is to incite ethnic tensions. The EEAS emphasizes in its analyses that FIMI actors “deliberately, strategically and in a coordinated manner try to manipulate facts, confuse and sow division, fear and hatred” in order to achieve their political goals. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this manifests itself through the constant recycling of war traumas, the relativization of genocide, conspiracy theories about “secret plans” to abolish entities or create a “unitary state”, as well as through the targeting of returnee communities. Any incident – from a local inter-ethnic conflict to a decision by an international institution – can be used as an opportunity for a campaign that deepens distrust between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.
The third layer refers to the direct undermining of democratic procedures, primarily elections. FIMI operations target electoral integrity on several levels: by spreading the narrative that the elections were “stolen”, that the Central Election Commission (CIK BiH) is working at the behest of foreigners, that the vote of the “ordinary person” means nothing, followed by placing false or manipulative polls and “estimates” of turnout, and by targeting specific groups of voters via social media. Combined with existing problems, such as clientelism, vote buying, and non-transparent campaign financing, such operations further undermine citizens’ trust in the democratic process.
An important channel for FIMI in BiH is the network of portals and “gray” media. The EEAS reports describe how operations such as “Doppelganger” or “False Façade” used fake media brands, cloned portals and covert networks of accounts to spread content that appears local and authentic, but is actually part of a coordinated campaign. While these specific examples mainly concern EU countries, the pattern is also recognizable in the Balkans: portals without imprints, with suspicious domains, massively downloading content from Russian sources or pro-Russian media in the region, often with sensationalist headlines and minimal fact-checking.
Social networks are another key layer of infrastructure. During political crises or before elections, there is a sharp increase in coordinated accounts that repeat the same messages, attack journalists, activists and independent institutions, and relativize or ridicule information coming from the EU, NATO or domestic regulatory bodies. The EEAS notes that at least 38,000 different accounts on 25 platforms were used in FIMI incidents during 2024, which shows the scale of the information manipulation industry. Although we do not have precise figures for Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is clear that the same patterns – bots, trolls, coordinated link sharing – appear in our digital space.
The role of domestic political actors in all of this is ambivalent. On the one hand, some political elites consciously adopt and amplify narratives coming from Russian or pro-Russian sources, because they yield political benefits for them in the short term: mobilization of the “patriotic” base, pressure on the international community, additional polarization that facilitates staying in power. On the other hand, even those actors who nominally advocate for the European path of Bosnia and Herzegovina often underestimate the seriousness of FIMI threats, reducing them to “propaganda” or “spin”, without understanding that this is a structured, long-term and strategic action.
The consequences for democratic processes are multifaceted. At the most visible level, FIMI contributes to the decline of trust in elections, institutions and the media. Citizens who believe that “everyone is the same”, that “everything is rigged” and that “nobody is telling the truth” become easy prey for authoritarian narratives and conspiracy theories. At a deeper level, FIMI erodes the very idea of a shared public space: if we cannot agree on even basic facts, then it is almost impossible to have a rational debate on public policies, reforms or European integration. The EEAS warns in its reports that this is precisely the ultimate goal of FIMI operations – not necessarily to convince everyone of one “truth”, but to produce confusion and cynicism in which the truth ceases to matter.
What can Bosnia and Herzegovina do in such an environment? At the institutional level, it is necessary to develop a clear strategy for combating disinformation and FIMI threats, aligned with European frameworks such as the FIMI Toolbox and Deterrence Playbook, which the EEAS is developing to make such operations “more costly and less sustainable” for perpetrators. This includes capacity building of regulatory bodies, security agencies and election administrations to monitor and document FIMI campaigns, but also establishing rapid response mechanisms – from denial and fact-checking to diplomatic and legal measures against foreign actors.
At the same time, without strengthening media literacy and societal resilience, institutional measures will have limited reach. Citizens must have the tools to recognize manipulative content, understand how social media algorithms work, and why “free” information is often paid for by someone’s political interest. In this sense, the work of fact-checking and education organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region should be seen as part of a broader democratic infrastructure, rather than as a marginal activity of enthusiasts.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that combating FIMI is not a fight against freedom of expression, but a fight for situation in which freedom of expression makes sense. When the information space is flooded with coordinated campaigns, bots and covert propaganda channels, the voices of citizens, journalists and experts are drowned out by the noise. This is precisely why the issue of FIMI and Russian disinformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is much more than a technical problem of “fake news” – it is a question of survival of the democratic processes in a country that is already burdened enough by internal crises.
If this layer of hybrid warfare is ignored, we risk waking up one day in a society where elections formally exist, but decisions have long been made elsewhere, in centers of power that have learned how to manipulate our information, emotions, and fears.