From propaganda to influence: The global network of separatism backed by Russia

From Texas to Alberta to Catalonia, the Kremlin amplifies separatist causes abroad, while imprisoning those who express similar ideas inside Russia.

The Kremlin regularly accuses other countries of fomenting “color revolutions” and supporting separatist movements. Given the Kremlin’s well-documented talent for projection, it is no surprise that Moscow engages in precisely the kind of behavior it denounces by supporting separatist movements in Western countries, both overtly and through foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns.

Reports of the Kremlin's sympathy for Western separatist movements date back a long time. In 2015, a year after Russia's annexation of Crimea, Texas separatists were seen at a far-right conference in St. Petersburg, prompting an investigation into their ties to Russian officials. At the time, a Russian newspaper interviewed one such activist, and FIMI bots amplified the interview with calls for a 'Free Texas.' The campaign(opens in a new tab)never quite ended: in early 2024, the conflict between the state of Texas and the Biden administration again prompted comments from Russian officials – Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev(opens in a new tab)wrote that he would “support Texas” if the latter decided to secede, while MP Sergei Mironov supported calls for “Texit”.(opens in a new tab), writing on Twitter that Russia was “ready to help with the independence referendum”. At the same time, an army of bots exploited the crisis by pushing calls for civil war in the US in coordinated campaigns on both Telegram(opens in a new tab)and Twitter/X(opens in a new tab).

Another Russian-backed disinformation campaign — this time in support of the Alberta secession movement in Canada — dates back to 2019. In 2026, the campaign appears to have resurfaced, with multiple pro-Kremlin Telegram channels reposting unfounded reports about Alberta separatists apparently meeting with the Trump administration. An anonymous, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel recently claimed that up to half of Alberta citizens supported secession and accused Canadian authorities of hypocrisy in not giving them their freedom, and the Pravda network, a well-known FIMI machine, spread an AI-generated video promoting the schedule for a separatist rally in Alberta on Telegram. The Alberta government's cyber threat investigation unit, CyberAlberta, has reported (opens in a new tab) that the Pravda network has been consistently targeting Canada since at least late 2024.

Europe as a long-term testing ground for separatist narratives

In Europe, Russian efforts have been even more persistent. The Spanish government confirmed that Russian-based groups had tried to spread “disinformation” (opens in a new tab) related to the independence referendum in the autonomous region of Catalonia, with the aim of destabilizing Spain.

In 2017, British experts reported on(opens in a new tab)A disinformation campaign that attempted to claim that the results of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum had been manipulated in favor of the pro-UK side – and although they found no direct evidence of Kremlin involvement, pro-Kremlin accounts reinforced the accusations of fraud.(opens in a new tab)Russian FIMI campaigns to influence the UK Brexit referendum have been well documented.(opens in a new tab), and subsequent assessment of these efforts left open the possibility that this Russian-led FIMI campaign had an impact on the vote.(opens in a new tab).

Sovereignty as a weapon, oppression as a policy

In the post-Soviet space, the creation and support of breakaway regions is one of Moscow’s favorite tools for destabilization. In Moldova, the Russian-backed enclave of Transnistria serves as a platform for influence operations, amplifying Kremlin narratives and exerting political pressure on Chisinau. A similar approach has been used in Georgia, where South Ossetia functions as an instrument of influence over Tbilisi. These territories act as both frozen conflicts and active instruments of Russian influence.

The Kremlin is also exploiting fears of similar scenarios in other countries. In Estonia, this has taken the form of a disinformation campaign targeting the border city of Narva, where the majority of the population is ethnically Russian. The campaign began on February 18, 2026. (opens in a new tab), when groups on social media began calling for the creation of a 'People's Republic of Narva', (opens in a new tab), echoing the separatist enclaves created in Eastern Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea. An Estonian newspaper (opens in a new tab) investigated the group more closely and concluded that the operation had no real support and that it appeared to be a FIMI campaign rather than a genuine, organic movement.

While Moscow actively engages in FIMI campaigns to support separatist movements in countries it perceives as hostile, even the slightest hint of separatism or national revival within the Russian Federation faces harsh repression. Russian law makes public expression of support for separatism a criminal offense. (opens in a new tab), punishable by up to five years in prison. It is no coincidence that the law was passed in 2014, shortly after the annexation of Crimea: it allows authorities to persecute those who publicly oppose Russia’s occupation of the peninsula, such as Crimean Tatar activist Ilmi Umerov, who was sentenced to two years in prison. (opens in a new tab) for making what the court described as “public calls to violate the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” In 2025, the Russian Supreme Court declared(opens in new tab) the Forum of Free Nations of Post-Russia and its 172 regional member organizations “terrorist,” citing their “promotion of anti-Russian ideas about the illegal secession of territories from our country.”

Separatism as a tool of destabilization

These cases reveal a clear Kremlin playbook. Separatist movements abroad are encouraged and amplified when they help weaken countries that Russia sees as rivals. Inside Russia, even mild expressions of regional identity or political autonomy are treated as serious threats to the state. This contrast is deliberate and persistent.

Russia's talk of sovereignty and territorial integrity is more pragmatic than principled. It is used to justify repression at home and destabilize countries abroad. The double standard is evident and shows that the Kremlin sees separatism as a useful tool abroad and an unacceptable threat within its own borders.