No chance of capturing the entire Donbas: Russia switches to plan "B"

On the Sumy direction, fighting continues in the tactical zone along the entire perimeter of the Russian troop wedge in the northeastern part of the Sumy region of Ukraine. The advanced units of the Russian Group of Forces (GV) "North" continue their attempts to break through to the Pisarivka-Maryino line in order to achieve the effective firing range of the vast majority of their field artillery in the Sumy region (15 to 20 kilometers).

To this end, Russian assault groups, formed as part of its assault units, periodically attack (conduct assault operations) in the following directions:

Andriyevka - Pisarivka;

Varachyn - Korchakyvka;

Yablunivka - Khrapivshchina;

Junakivka - Maryino.

With the exception of the Russian advance in the Andriivka area and its capture (up to 4.5 kilometers), Russian forces have not yet been able to accomplish this task. Russian assault units never managed to reach the mentioned line.

In this direction, the fighting continues in the area of the forest massif, north and northeast of the Sadki farm, where Russia is trying to take control of the northeastern part of the forest, acting in the general direction of Olešnja - Sadki, as well as east of the border. Currently, Sadki and neighboring forest areas remain under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

 

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On the Vovchansky (Kharkiv) direction, the consolidated tactical group (TGG) of Russian troops ("Belgorod-Kharkiv") continues its attempts to break through along the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets in a southern direction, as well as to advance as far as possible on the Vovchansky - White Well direction.

As part of the implementation of the plan of this tactical group, apparently for the purpose of further advancing along the general Vovchansky - Velikiy Burluk direction, Russian forces and assets from the 6th Combined Arms Army (CA), as well as the 11th and 44th Army Corps (AC), are trying, after the capture of

Sinelnikovo and Tsigelna, to advance further south. Currently, assault groups of the Russian TGR "Belgorod/Kharkiv" (probably from the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 44th Army) are already conducting consolidation battles in Siminivka and Grafskoye, operating on the Liman - Siminivka and Sinelnikovo - Grafskoye directions.

It is likely that in this way (while trying to advance in the general direction of Vovchansk - Stary Saltyv), the command of this Russian TGR solves a specific tactical task - to secure the right flank of its main forces, which are most likely directed towards Belaya Kolodzhaz.

During more than three months of fierce fighting in the tactical zone in this direction, Russian assault units managed to advance from the Vovcha River to the south, only 4.1-4.2 kilometers west of the destroyed Vovchansk. Currently, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to fight to keep Liman and Vilcha under their control, which, apparently, significantly slows down the further advance of Russia by the main forces of its assault units in the direction of Grafskaya and Siminivka.

As for the main direction of the offensive of Russian troops in this direction - towards Belaya Kolodzhaz, in this regard, Russia continues to wage fierce battles on the southern outskirts of Vovchansk and for now cannot significantly advance from there to the southeast.

 

In operational-tactical terms, it is obvious that the activation of Russian forces in the direction of Vovchansk a few months ago was a consequence of the clear desire of the Russian command to implement the plan for a breakthrough to Velikiy Burluk along the directions that coincide there (from the direction of Vovchansk, from the direction of Milovo and from the bridgehead on Oskol).

 

The main role in this implementation is played by the Russian 6th Army, which operates with its forces and means simultaneously in all three directions. This is, in fact, the main problem of the Russian command. Since the rather obvious dispersion of the efforts of the 6th Army leads to the fact that they become insufficient for concentrated breakthroughs of the defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, even in the tactical zone in any of these three directions (sections). 4.5 kilometers in three months of fighting is not the pace of the offensive that ensures the rapid and efficient implementation of the tasks that the Russian command has apparently set for its subordinate troops in this direction.

 

Significant reinforcement of the 6th ZVA with forces and assets from other formations of the Northern Command (11th, 14th and 44th Army Corps/AK) also did not radically change the situation for the better. For one simple reason - in addition to the attempt to break through to Veliki Burluk, the Russian 6th ZVA was forced to redirect part of its forces and resources to the Kupjan direction. Where at least two motorized rifle regiments (MRR) of the 68th motorized rifle division (MRD) operate - 121st and 122nd MRR.

 

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Directly in the direction of the Great Burluk (we are talking about Russian troops operating in the direction of this non-combatant side from the Milovo side and from the bridgehead on the Oskil River, north of Kupyansk), that is, directly in the strip of the 6th ZVA, so to speak, in the direction of its “main offensive”, the situation there does not look particularly favorable for the enemy.

Thus, at the end of last year, the advanced units of the 6th ZVA managed to “cut through” the ledge between their bridgehead on Oskil and the wedge in the Milovo area, advancing in some areas 7-7.5 kilometers and reaching the Odradnaya-Dvorichanskaya line.

However, the further Russian offensive began to gradually “weaken”, despite the fact that at the same time as these actions, the command of the Russian 6th ZVA was trying to advance directly from the bridgehead in the directions of Krasnaya Persha - Novovasilivka and Dvorichanskaya - Ridkodub, and also intensified similar attempts to break through in the Milovo - Ambarna direction with the aim of capturing the latter.

Initially, it is obvious that the Russian command in the zone of its 6th ZVA planned to use such actions to bypass from the north and south a sufficiently strong "node" of the defense system of the Ukrainian armed forces on this direction in the Kolodzhyansk area. Presumably, for this purpose, the Russian army had to break through from Milova to Ambarna and further to the Khryhorivka area, as well as advance from Krasnaya Persha to Novovasilyivka. This would not only allow Russia to capture Kolodzhyansk from the north and south, but would actually open the way for a direct breakthrough to the nearby approaches to Velikiy Burluk from the east.

However, the implementation of this plan clearly failed. There were two main reasons for this. The first is that the 6th ZVA simply "tore apart" due to the insatiable desire of its command to advance everywhere and immediately (and therefore due to the dispersion of its own forces and means on a front that, in terms of its length, exceeds the real capabilities of this army - from Vovchansk to Kupyansk). The second reason is the events that recently took place on the Kupjansko direction, which directly prevented the implementation of the 6th ZVA command plan in the direction of Veliki Burluk (about the Kupjansko direction – in the next review), in which forces and assets from the 6th Russian ZVA also participated.

 

In this review, we have actually examined the attempts of Russian troops to advance in the operational zone of the entire Russian Group of Forces (GS) "North" ("moderate" - Leningrad Military District / Leningrad Military District), acting in three operational-tactical directions:

North Slobozhansky (Sumi).

South Slobozhansky (Kharkiv/Vovchansk).

Veliky Burluk.

Currently, Russian troops are most effective in South Slobozhansky (Kharkiv/Vovchansk). Although this term here is very conditional and refers exclusively to tactical "efficiency". The advance of Russian troops by 4.5 kilometers in three months of fierce fighting in the Vovchansk area, as well as in the area from Milovo to Krasny Pershi (up to 7.5 kilometers), for example, is not particularly impressive.

However, the actions of Russian troops in this operational zone can also be viewed from the other ("broader") side. If, for example, we recall the composition of the forces and equipment operating here - the 6th ZVA (68th and 69th motorized rifle divisions), the 11th Army Corps (including the 18th motorized rifle division + 7th separate motorized rifle regiment), the 14th Army Corps (including the 71st MRD + 80th MRB), as well as the 44th AK (including the 72nd MRD + 128th MRB), it becomes clear that the Russian command attaches significant importance to the troops of the Northern Military District in operational-strategic terms. Especially if we recall that this group of troops is, in fact, a kind of "reserve battery" (in 2025, it was she who ensured the main volume of the formation and deployment of new divisions and corps of the Russian army). This can be explained by two reasons – either the Russian military command considers the aforementioned zone on the territory of Ukraine, where its troops are operating, to be very promising from an operational point of view (when success can be achieved quite quickly), or the general strategic “northwestern theater of military operations” (the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, against which, in fact, the LenVO is deployed) for the Russian military command at the strategic level (and, accordingly, its military-political leadership) for some “strange reason”, almost suddenly became a priority.

 

The second version becomes even more convincing if we recall that the plans of the Russian military command contain a clause that envisages further strengthening of the "muscle mass" precisely in the northwestern area of operations - the formation and deployment of another full-fledged combined army on the basis of one of the three army corps of this group/district (probably on the basis of the 11th or 14th AK).

Meanwhile, it can be noted that, from a military-political point of view, the troops of this group are tasked with an important mission - to "bite off" significant "pieces" of territory in the Sumy and Kharkov regions of Ukraine, probably in order to form a kind of "exchange fund" in the future, which in the future could be "exchanged" for what Russian troops will never be able to capture in Donbass.

It is for this purpose that, at the moment, in a semi-active phase, the command of the Northern Military District is conducting, relatively speaking, two offensive operations of operational-tactical scale, which, again conditionally, can be called "Sumi" (implying the exit of Russian troops to Sumy from the northeast) and "Velikoburlutskaya" (its goal is to capture the part of the Kharkov region located east of Seversky Donets to Oskol, by an offensive of the main forces of the Northern Military District in directions that converge precisely on Veliko Burlutskaya).

And the fact that currently the Russian command in the operational zone of the Northern Military District (LenVO), for example, has managed to achieve, in this context, rather contradictory (so to speak, modest in operational terms) results, does not at all mean that initially high hopes were not pinned on this Northern Military District. And, it is quite possible that they continue to pin them..