The four futures of Russia – and why none of them scare Belarus as much as the present
Russian oligarch of Belarusian origin Andrei Melnichenko (coal, chemicals, No. 8 on the Forbes Russia list) published a programmatic article in The Economist titled "Why a Destroyed Russia Is Bad for the World." The central idea: after the war in Ukraine ends, Russia must retain its sovereignty, or things will get worse. There will be less security, less predictability, and more risks.
The sanctioned oligarch argues this thesis as follows:
- A Russia that retains full sovereignty is better than any of the four alternative scenarios because it can be a partner in security matters, much like the Soviet Union was;
- Russia has limited, clearly expressed interests, and it is better and cheaper to take them into account than to try to reduce a large country (a global player) to a dependent status;
- The classic nuclear threat. Of course, Melnichenko threatens no one, but the softness of the wording should not deceive. Whether in the part where he describes the possible further development of the war, or where he predicts the consequences of a possible collapse of Russia, the conversation is precisely about the potential use of nuclear weapons.
And, of course, the current political system of Russia is presented as a kind of constant, a given, an internal matter of Russia itself, subject only to indefinite evolutionary development.
The four scenarios of Russia's loss of sovereignty that are supposed to frighten the Western reader are as follows:
- A humiliated Russia – stuck on the periphery of the West. In his logic, this does not create order but accumulates "deferred energy" (analogous to Versailles), leading in the long run to aggressive revanchism.
- Vassalization by China – Russia formally retains the attributes of a great power but effectively becomes a raw materials appendage and buffer for Beijing's interests. The author considers this path unstable and even disadvantageous for China itself.
- Fragmentation of Russia – collapse, a struggle for the nuclear arsenal, resources, and borders. It destroys the cohesion on which nuclear deterrence rests.
- Russia as a fortress – closed, mobilized, in a state of permanent siege. In some ways similar to present-day Iran. War becomes not an event but a permanent way of organizing the state.
The overall conclusion? It is not explicitly stated, but it should sound like this (addressed to the West): agree to Putin's current terms (formulated as: part of the territory, the status of the Russian language, Ukraine's formal neutrality), support Russia's sovereignty as a global player, do not interfere in its internal affairs – and then... what then?
Perhaps, you Westerners, you will get the security that (for you) is the highest value. Otherwise, it will be worse; we are not responsible.