The growing Russian influence in Eastern and Central Europe
Introduction:
Since Russia’s war in Ukraine began in February 2022, the European Union has shown a more unified and assertive stance in Eastern Europe. This has been evident in the consensus on sanctions against Russia, strong support for Ukraine, the revival of the enlargement process with Moldova and Ukraine granted candidate status, and a conditional offer of membership to Georgia.
But the main question here is whether this represents a systemic shift or just a flickering geopolitical moment? On the other hand, a growing Kremlin-friendly bloc in Central Europe would pose a major problem for the EU.
Former Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, who is once again leading in national surveys, is expected to join Minister Viktor Orbán and his Slovak colleague Robert Fico. Similar to Fico, the Czech tycoon has expressed a desire to lessen backing for Ukraine as it
opposes the Russian aggression on Ukraine.
At the same time, with Herbert Kickl in strong position to become chancellor of Austria, the European Union’s establishment should prepare itself for more suffering and an immense blow to its position against Vladimir Putin of Russia.
A Babiš comeback and Vienna getting its first far-right leader since World War II “Herbert Kickl” would cement the illiberal flank in central Europe led by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico in Slovakia, raising alarm bells in the EU and Nato about maintaining unity in helping Ukraine against Russia’s invasion.
Hungary and Slovakia dependence on the Russian Oil
Since the Russia-Ukraine war, many countries have pledged to end or restrict their oil and gas imports to curtail Moscow’s revenues and hinder its war effort. EU nations have ended imports of Russian oil brought in by sea, and a ban on refined oil products will come in from 5 February 2023 although Europe is a significant importer of Russian energy and the Russian economy is heavily reliant on its energy sector.
Hungary, which imports 65% of its oil from Russia through pipelines was a main opponent especially that Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, has good relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[1]
Hungary joins Slovakia to try and leverage EU rules to preserve access to a discounted product nearly everyone else has been forced to shun: Russian oil. Their actions follow Ukrainian restrictions that might deprive the two nations of a third of their oil imports by preventing pipeline crude sold by Lukoil, Russia’s biggest private oil company, from transiting through Ukraine.
EU resentment of Budapest is growing as nations are fed up of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s close links to Russia and his constant attempts to delay sanctions. As populist Prime Minister Robert Fico shifts Bratislava towards a more pro-Russian posture and halts state-sponsored military assistance to Ukraine, Slovakia is also becoming more and more resentful of the EU.[2]
Following their prime minister’s surprise journey to Moscow before Christmas on December 22, over 35,000 people rallied in towns and cities throughout Slovakia to support their country’s European identity and future and to express solidarity with Ukraine, their neighbour.
The leader of the populist Smer party, “Fico”, described his quick visit as an effort to guarantee that gas from Russia will continue to pass via Slovakia and Ukraine on its way to Europe and to avoid a huge economic loss for his nation if it were to stop. In an effort to lessen the revenue that Russia receives from the transaction, Ukraine actually carried out its long-promised plans to stop the supply of Russian gas across its territory on January 1.
Additionally, although the European Commission and other EU nations backed this action as part of an attempt to reduce the bloc’s reliance on Russian gas, Fico asserted that Slovakia would lose 500 million euros annually in transit fees and that the loss of cheaper Russian gas would undermine the entire European economy.
Slovakia is adopting a “two-track foreign policy” oriented at “all sides of the world”. Essentially, this means avoiding outspoken support for Ukraine, denouncing the EU, meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov three times so far, and displaying an odd fondness for conspiracy theories and pro-Russian misinformation.
Thus, it is fair to argue that “Fico” is highly affected by Viktor Orban’s government’s so-called “independent foreign policy”, which is based on national interests and combining “the best elements of both idealism and realism.[3]
Kremlin-friendly bloc in Central Europe
The pro-Russia bloc at the heart of Europe is forecast to grow in 2025 as Austria is forming a government coalition led by Herbert Kickl, the leader of the “Freedom” Party, which maintains ties with the “United Russia” Party led by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Also, In the Czech Republic, former populist President Andrej Babiš may return to power, strengthening Russian influence. [4]
A Babiš comeback would cement the illiberal flank in central Europe led by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico in Slovakia, raising concerns in the EU and Nato about maintaining unity in helping Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. [5]
Babiš is a billionaire political chameleon who has shifted his party to the right and is repeating the rhetoric of his rivals in Hungary and Slovakia, while having less ideological roots than Orbán or Fico. Since Babiš joined the Hungarian leader’s new hard-right, anti-migration Patriots faction in Brussels this summer, top Czech officials have tried to paint him as being in Orbán’s pocket. The Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský argued that Babiš’s ANO movement is merely Orbán’s puppet and They have obviously made friends among pro-Russian nationalists and xenophobes in the European Parliament.[6]
With Herbert Kickl in the lead to become Austria’s chancellor, the European Union’s establishment is likely going to suffer with a further blow to its position against Vladimir Putin.
Kickl, who would go on to become Austria’s first far-right leader since World War II, has openly expressed his admiration for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He is likely to adopt a similar strategy, which involves pursuing hardline policies in areas such as migration, connecting with the Kremlin, and clashing with the EU mainstream. If his Freedom Party (FPÖ) takes charge, it would mean a swathe of the EU, from Hungary through Austria to Slovakia under outspoken Prime Minister Robert Fico and potentially to the Czech Republic, where former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš is leading in polls ahead of an election in October. Obviously, they are all showing support toward Putin’s full-scale war of Ukraine.[7]
The growing Russian influence at the EU
The European institutions are witnessing an increase in Russian influence through the rise of parties and politicians loyal to Moscow, which poses a threat to the unity of the European Union and its policies. This is being achieved by taking advantage of the Union’s consensus rule, which allows one nation to block decisions, as demonstrated by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s threat to veto the Union’s sanctions against Russia.
The European Parliament established the “Patriots of Europe” group, which consists of Russia-friendly parties like the “Matteo Salvini” League in Italy, the “Freedom Party” in Austria, and the “Fidesz party” in Hungary, which is led by Orban. Now the third largest bloc in the parliament, this group regularly opposes backing for Ukraine. Furthermore, Czech Prime Minister “Petr Fiala” claimed that the “Patriots of Europe” group, whether intentionally or unintentionally, promotes Russian objectives.
Furthermore, Some representatives from the German party “Alternative for Germany” are among the European Parliament members who are suspected of accepting funds from the Kremlin to disseminate the Russian propaganda. This dynamic presents a “systemic threat” to the European Union, especially when a “traitor at the table” impedes decision-making.[8]
Europe’s “Arc of Instability”
Unfortunately, A group of “in-between” European nations is now more vulnerable and unsafe than ever as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. These nations—Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia—are situated in what a lot of scholars referred to as an “Arc of Instability” that runs between Russia and the EU.[9]
Several of these “in-between” nations are potential members of the European Union, but they are all strengthening their links with the EU while not being part of NATO or the EU. They are also home to pro-Russian political groups and commercial interests, and they continue to have strong ties to Russia. Russian gas is still purchased by many. The Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), both of which are led by Russia, include Armenia as a member. However, the country is currently reassessing the value of membership in these organizations.
Indeed, the US and the EU have committed significant new political and financial resources since 2022 to support these countries.[10]
The most public manifestation of the confrontation between Russia and the West in the in-between countries is in the realm of ideas. Moscow’s messaging has evolved since 2022. The weakened Russia of today places more emphasis on its ideological message—that it offers an alternative pole to the West, particularly the “global hegemon” of the United States, which is portrayed as the puppet master of unwilling European nations—than on its role as a patron of security and a supplier of energy.
The Russian leadership hardly ever asserts that it is more successful than the West in the struggle for the hearts and minds of people in Eastern Europe. Instead, it focusses on critiquing two important facets of the West. The first is the moral decay of Western nations; the second is their purported double standards and failure to live up to their grandiose rhetoric.[11]
Conclusion
To conclude, there is an obvious increase in Russian influence globally especially in Eastern and Central Europe. This claim could be supported by the subtle grow of the pro-Russia bloc at the heart of Europe with Herbert Kickl, the leader of the “Freedom” Party in Austria is expected to become the next chancellor of Austria and the return of the former populist President Andrej Babiš to power in Czech Republic which is likely going to strengthen the Russian influence.
Thus, A Babiš comeback with Kickl becoming the chancellor of Austria would cement the illiberal flank in central Europe led by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico in Slovakia. Consequently, this coalition is expected to create significant challenges for Europe. Challenges that would show the gap between the legacy of “Old Europe,” which was built on liberal values and political and economic integration, and the rise of nationalist tendencies and unilateral approaches which raises questions about the future of the EU. Therefore, one could say that the EU should expect a complete change of the power dynamics in the region.
