Does China Want (Parts of) Siberia Back?

Chinese payback time in Russia’s Far East? Parts of today’s Russian Siberia belonged to the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) before China was obliged to cede them to the Russian Empire after signing yet another one of the so-called “unequal treaties” in the second half of the XIX century, the kind of treaties China was pushed into signing with the British Empire, France, the United States, Japan and others. The treaties stood for a partial loss of sovereignty and China’s obligation to grant colonial powers territorial and trade concessions as dictated by the Western invaders. The very centerpiece of China’s so-called “Century of Humiliation”, i.e. roughly 100 years of foreign invasions with a weak China finding itself at the receiving end of Western colonialism and territorial expansionism. Already in 1854 Russia sent settlers down the Amur River to set up colonies along the riverbank, beyond the demarcation line set on the northern edge of the Amur River’s basin with the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. The actual transfer of Chinese territory to Tsarist Russia started just a few years later, in 1858 with the Treaty of Aigun. Through that treaty the northern bank of the Amur River – roughly 150.000 square miles – was formally transferred to Tsarist Russia. In 1860, the Treaty of Beijing confirmed the Treaty of Aigun and, to add insult to injury, China was obliged to cede a further 100.000 square miles of territories to Russia.

Hence, roughly 250.000 square miles in total of Russia’s Far East territories have been taken from China, at least as far as  Chinese nationalists are concerned who at times suggest on Chinese social media channels that re-taking (parts of) Siberia is what Xi Jinping had in mind when he announced the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” back in 2012. To be sure, while Chinese censors are usually quick taking such suggestions off the web in no time, there is little doubt that the idea of re-incorporating parts of Siberia into China will continue emerging every once in a while.

Fast forward to 2026 and today it is China which is accused in Russia of pursuing economic policies to “colonize” parts of Russia’s Far East and Siberia. On Siberian ground today, Beijing rapidly continues to expand its investments and natural resources extraction activities. Chinese state-owned or subsidized companies are extracting raw materials – such as timber, coal, and minerals – and developing infrastructure primarily for Chinese needs in Russia’s Far East and Siberia. And the list of Chinese involvement in Russia’s Far Eastern infrastructure development and resources exploitation is getting longer (and longer). In 2023, Russia opened the port of Vladivostok for China’s disposal as a cross-border transit hub for domestic trade. Part of what looks like China’s continuous expansion of its economic and also cultural influence in Siberia – arguably similar to what Beijing is doing along its disputed borders in the Himalayas and in the South China Sea: creeping annexation through the occupation of disputed territories while avoiding direct military conflict. And there is (much) more Chinese business going in Russia’s Far East. In order to facilitate and promote Chinese investments in Siberia – above all in the Outer Manchuria region – Russia has set up various so-called Advanced Special Economic Zones and Special Administrative Regions in Russia’s Far East and Siberia. In these regions all economic activities are conducted in Chinese yuan (as opposed to Russian ruble) since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While official maps began showing Chinese names on Russian territories, Beijing is expressing an interest in Russia’s Siberian region of Vladivostok and an island in Amur Oblast, both of which were part of the Qing Empire before Russia annexed the region in the XIX century. There, Chinese companies have concluded long-term lease agreements allowing them to access thousands of hectares of forests. Parts of Siberia, which by now are – in a decisively uncomplimentary fashion – referred to as China’s “resource hinterland” or “resource colony”. Back in 2015, Moscow agreed to grant the Chinese company Huae Xinban Russia’s access to 115.000 hectares of land in the eastern Zabaikalsky region in Siberia under a 49-year lease agreement. A survey conducted by the Russian online news portal Rosbalt at the time showed that more than 50% of local respondents fear that leasing land to China prepares the ground for China’s colonization and later annexation of Siberia. While leasing Russian territory is not necessarily – at least not yet – the same as China annexing territory from Russia, Beijing has in the South China Sea over recent years impressively demonstrated that it is very much prepared to back-up and underline its territorial claims with the creation of facts on the ground. Such as the construction of military bases on artificial islands (very) in disputed waters in the South China Sea. Ask the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and other Southeast countries, whose competing  territorial claims have arguably been rendered obsolete through the construction of by now 27 Chinese military military bases in the South China Sea. 

While Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi refer to their friendship and alliance as “unbreakable” ordering their respective propaganda organs to cheer and report on Russian-Chinese solidarity and comradeship 24/7, Russia’s Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) is seemingly less convinced that Beijing is acting in good faith. And that is putting it mildly, as it turns out. In fact, the very opposite is the case, as the New York Times reported back in 2025. A leaked eight pages-long document drafted by the FSB warns that China has its eyes very much on Siberia and Russia’s Far East. Therefore China is an enemy and “serious threat” to Russia’s security, the report says. The New York Times also reported on increased in Chinese intelligence activities in Russia’s Far East and Siberia. While the official feel-good and grandiose joint Russian-Chinese official declarations suggest otherwise, seen from Beijing, Russia is a power in decline unable to exploit and defend its natural resources – including or indeed above all those in the country’s Far East. Resources which comprise vast reserves of oil, gas, gold, diamonds, rare earth minerals and fresh water. Siberia’s natural resources could help achieve China’s GDP growth targets and satisfy the country’s soaring energy demands.

Maybe not today or tomorrow, but there is little doubt that the stronger China gets economically and militarily, the bigger the temptation will become in Beijing to reclaim what China had to hand over to Russia during the aforementioned “Century of Humiliation”. A declining Russia might indeed one day find itself at the receiving end of Chinese territorial expansionism and its unsatiable hunger for natural resources and fresh water. With Chinese friends like these, who in Moscow needs enemies?